

Social Perception in Negotiation:

How do perceptions of warmth and competence affect negotiation behavior and outcomes?

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Introduction

The two fundamental dimensions by which we perceive and evaluate others have long been identified in social psychology as warmth and competence (Abele & Wojciszke, 2007; Asch, 1946; Bales, 1950; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007; Rosenberg, Nelson, & Vivekananthan, 1968;). These dimensions stem from our evolutionary needs to quickly assess someone's character by first determining whether someone intends to do us harm and if so, to consider whether the other person has the capability to act successfully upon those intentions (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997; Fiske et al., 2007). From these basic assessments of distinguishing friend from foe, we continue to use warmth and competence as important indicators of social perception in our everyday lives, from our professional to our personal encounters.

The warmth dimension involves perceiving the intentions of this other person and therefore determining how likeable we find them (Fiske et al., 2007). Warmth has been characterized as friendliness, trustworthiness, morality, helpfulness, and sincerity (Fiske et al., 2007; Wojciszke, 1994; Wojciszke, 1998). The competence dimension, on the other hand, is related to perceiving the abilities of this other person and therefore determining how respectable we find them (Fiske et al., 2007; Wojciszke, 1994; Wojciszke, 1998). Competence has been characterized as intelligence, skill, efficacy, and creativity (Fiske et al., 2007; Wojciszke, 1994;

Wojciszke, 1998). In all of our social encounters, we are unconsciously or consciously signaling our own warmth and competence and perceiving the warmth and competence of others.

Our impressions and subsequent behaviors toward another person can largely be understood by our warmth and competence perceptions of that person (Wojciszke, 1994; Wojciszke, 1998). These determinations have important consequences for whom we decide to cooperate with, befriend, and trust, as well as those we decide to compete against, hurt and deceive. Our perceptions of warmth and competence and the behaviors that stem from these impressions are particularly salient in the context of negotiations, where individuals are trying to fulfil their individual goals through both cooperation and competition with others (Pruitt, 1983; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). In this chapter, we aim to illustrate how the basic psychological principle of social perception, specifically the two fundamental dimensions of warmth and competence, affect perceptions, behavior and consequences in negotiations.

Basic Psychological Principle: Fundamental Dimensions of Social Perception

Empirical research on social perception began with a classic study where individuals were asked to describe their impressions of others using a variety of trait adjectives. Asch found that these traits clustered around two major categories of “warm” and “cold” (Asch, 1946). In a subsequent and separate study that asked participants to organize a long list of character traits into categories that could be associated together, researchers found that participants were spontaneously identifying two major dimensions of “social good-bad” and “intellectual good-bad” (Rosenberg et al., 1968). Researchers have largely settled on two dimensions of social perception being most powerful and pervasive and while the specific nomenclature varies, the two fundamental dimensions can be referred to as warmth and competence (Fiske et al., 2007).

How do warmth and competence relate to each other?

Out of these two dimensions, warmth judgments are formed first and carry more weight (Cacioppo et al., 1997; Peeters, 2002; Reeder, Kumar, Hesson-McInnis, & Trafimow, 2002; Ybarra, Chan, & Park, 2001; Willis & Todorov, 2006). Going back to our biological need to quickly determine whether a stranger is a friend or foe, the warmth judgment of whether this person intends to do us harm is the first critical assessment we make before then determining whether they are capable of acting out their intentions. In this way, some scholars argue that the warmth dimension predicts whether the interpersonal judgment is positive or negative, whereas the competence dimension gives us clues as to the strength of that impression (Wojciszke, 1998). Empirical evidence also suggests that our perceptions of warmth are processed more rapidly than our assessments of another person's competence (Willis & Todorov, 2006; Ybarra et al., 2001).

We hold different beliefs about how diagnostic each of these two dimensions is in representing a person's overall character (Fiske et al., 2007). In other words, on the warmth determinations, we find that warm behavior is less diagnostic of true character than not-warm behavior. We find that being nice is more controllable and may be driven by social cues, whereas not-warm, or mean, behavior is more likely to reflect true dispositions (Fiske et al., 2007; Singh & Teoh, 2000; Skowronski & Carlston, 1987; Ybarra & Stephan, 1999). Competence perceptions work in the opposite way, in the sense that we see competence as not under an individual's control, so we see positive perceptions of competence as more diagnostic than negative perceptions (Fiske et al., 2007). Therefore, a person who fails to be nice on a single occasion is more likely to be characterized as low on warmth, but a person who fails to act competently on a single occasion is more likely to have this failure dismissed as an incidental fluke.

Why do warmth and competence judgments matter?

Identifying these dimensions is important because our warmth and competence impressions of another person are consistently tied to specific emotional reactions and behaviors (Fiske et al., 2007). It is generally understood that those who are perceived highly on both dimensions are regarded positively, while those who are perceived as low on warmth and competence are regarded negatively (Fiske et al., 2007). What is more interesting are the asymmetries where either we use one dimension as diagnostic of the other or when we perceive someone as high on one dimension while low on the other.

When we perceive others on an individual basis, we are more likely to perceive them as high or low on both dimensions (known as the “halo effect”), but interestingly when we perceive others as social groups, we are more likely to judge groups as high on one dimension and low on another (Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick 1999; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Rosenberg et al., 1968; Yzerbyt, Provost, & Corneille, 2005; Zanna & Hamilton, 1972). Our impressions of another person as high on one dimension and low on the other, known as the “compensatory effect,” are most likely to take place at both the individual and the group level when there is a comparison between two social objects of judgment (Judd et al., 2005).

Given that our different warmth and competence judgments of others are associated with specific emotions and behaviors, scholars have found that negative perceptions and stereotypes do not simply arise from purely negative feelings of dislike, antipathy or hatred (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Some social groups are perceived ambivalently (high on one dimension and low on the other) and where these groups map onto these fundamental dimensions of warmth and competence predict our different behaviors toward outgroups (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002).

The warmth dimension has been demonstrated to lead to active behaviors of helping or attacking (on opposing ends of the dimension), whereas the competence dimension has been linked to passive behaviors of associating or neglecting (again, on opposing ends of the dimension) (Cuddy et al., 2007; Fiske et al., 2002). These behaviors stem from different emotional antecedents as determined by the two dimensions, with this framework described as the BIAS (behaviors from intergroup affect and stereotypes) map (Cuddy et al., 2007). Toward someone who is high on both dimensions, I feel admiration. For someone high in warmth, but low in competence, I feel pity. For someone high in competence, but low on warmth, I feel envy. And for those who are low on both dimensions, I feel contempt.

Utilizing this BIAS map framework to understand how warmth and competence perceptions of our counterparts drive our emotional reactions and subsequent behaviors will provide an interesting lens to further understand the social dynamics at play in a negotiation, where individuals are strategically choosing how to cooperate and compete with one another.

Social Perception in Negotiations

The role of social perception in mixed motive conflicts is interesting not only because of the ubiquitous nature of negotiations in our professional and personal lives, but also because social psychologists have found interpersonal conflict to be a context in which individuals are routinely perceiving and attributing their counterpart's behavior to personality traits, which in turn affect reactions and conflict resolution strategies (Orvis, Kelley, & Butler, 1976; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). In general, our ability to recognize and enact the optimal strategies in a negotiation ultimately determine negotiation outcomes (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2008). Theories on conflict resolution suggest that the strategies selected by the negotiators are often determined by the negotiator's perceptions and attributions of the counterpart's behavior (Schelling, 1960).

Even though it has been argued that negotiation behavior is largely driven by a negotiator's economic bargaining situation, rather than the negotiator's personality traits, individuals often attribute negotiation behavior to personality traits (Malhotra & Bazerman, 2008; Thompson, 2009; Wheeler, 2002). A bargaining situation can be understood in terms of the negotiator's alternatives, referred to as the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, or BATNA (Raiffa, 1982; White & Neale, 1991). The BATNA can vary both in its value and its riskiness and it has been argued that these factors are what determines a negotiator's bargaining behavior and style (Thompson, 2009).

The tendency to attribute behavior to personality, rather than situational demands, has long been studied in social psychology and is referred to as the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 1977) or the correspondent bias (Jones, 1990), where individuals attribute the behaviors of others to certain corresponding traits. Even when negotiators acknowledge externally imposed situational limitations on the counterpart, the negotiators will still attribute their counterparts' bargaining behavior to personal intent, perceiving counterparts with larger constraints as having greater competitive intent (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Pruitt & Drews, 1969). While hard bargaining strategies, such as haggling are more often caused by the negotiator's situational limitations, such as the value of his or her BATNA, counterpart's will perceive the haggling behavior as more indicative of the negotiator's disagreeable or competitive nature (Morris, Larrick, & Su, 1999).

Negotiators also play an active role in managing their own impressions (Goffman, 1959; Leary, 1995). While the majority of the work on person perception has studied it from the perspective of the observer, other work has studied warmth and competence from the perspective of the actor who is strategically managing their own impressions (Holoien & Fiske, 2013). The

interpersonal theory of social interaction (Kiesler, 1983) posits two primary dimensions that motivate individuals' behavior in dyadic contexts, often referred to as "affiliation" and "dominance" (Carson, 1969; Foa, 1961; Wiggins, 1979). Affiliation refers to the extent to which a person acts in an agreeable and friendly manner, ranging from warmth to hostility, and maps squarely onto the "warmth" dimension of social perception (Kiesler, 1983). Dominance refers to the extent to which a person seeks to exert influence over his or her interaction partner, ranging from dominant to submissive, and can be seen as mapping onto the "competence" dimension of social perception (Kiesler, 1983).

Individuals understand the trade-off, or compensatory effect between warmth and competence, and utilize this effect when actively managing their own impressions (Holoien & Fiske, 2013; Judd et al., 2005). In other words, when trying to appear competent, individuals will downplay their warmth. When trying to appear competent individuals will become overly critical and display low warmth by becoming unfriendly or disagreeable (Amabile & Glazebrook, 1982; Gibson & Oberlander, 2008). And when the main objective is to appear warm, individuals will downplay their competence, so as to reduce the level of threat that could be posed by their competence which would stand in the way of their affiliation goals (Amabile & Glazebrook, 1982; Gibson & Oberlander, 2008). The compensatory relationship between warmth and competence as demonstrated in impression formation has also been shown to govern impression management as individuals strategically downplay certain characteristics in order to emphasize others (Holoien & Fiske, 2013). In this way, it will be interesting to explore when negotiators choose to prioritize their own warmth or competence during a negotiation and whether and how they might strategically utilize the compensatory effect in order to actively manage their own impressions.

Is conveying warmth or competence more effective in a negotiation?

The answer to this question is not straightforward given complexities arising from two different sources. The first complexity comes from understanding what kind of negotiation is taking place and what the goals are for the negotiators. The second complexity arises from differing psychological theories, specifically the nuances associated with how we convey and accurately perceive warmth and competence; how these two dimensions relate to one another; and predicting the associated emotional and behavioral reactions.

We will address the former source of complexity first. A negotiation is defined as an interaction in which individuals are communicating with each other in order to resolve their perceived divergent interests and reach their individual goals (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). Negotiations can be both informal or formal and they govern almost all social relationships (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984). When looking at the efficacy of warmth and competence strategies enacted in a negotiation, it is critical to distinguish between distributive and integrative negotiations. Distributive negotiations are single-issue negotiations, where motives are purely competitive (Thompson, 2009). Two or more players can be seen as “splitting the pie” so that one player’s gains are in a direct inverse relationship to the other player’s losses. Integrative negotiations, on the other hand, are multi-issue negotiations, where the negotiators’ goals are both cooperative and competitive in nature (Fisher & Ury, & Patton, 2011; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt, 1991; Thompson, 2009). By sharing critical information, negotiators can identify ways for value creation, so that joint benefits can be reached as the “size of the pie grows” (De Dreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975).

A negotiator’s goals can be identified by first recognizing whether the negotiation is distributive or integrative in nature and by further considering other important factors, including

whether there is opportunity for future interactions. As reputational concerns come into play, a negotiator's goals of purely individual economic gains are balanced by making sure his or her counterpart feels satisfied both with the negotiation process and the outcome. The issue of objective and subjective values in a negotiation are important for considering whether goals have been successfully met in a negotiation, since successful outcomes go beyond economic outcomes depending on the negotiation context (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; Thompson, Valley, & Kramer, 1995).

The "compensatory effect" would warn negotiators that actively conveying one of the fundamental dimensions of social perception may result in being judged poorly on the other dimension. Whether and how this affects negotiation outcomes depend largely on the negotiator's goals. For example, if you convey warmth in a negotiation, you may be seen by your counterpart as warm but not competent. According to the BIAS map framework, this can result in your counterpart engaging in active facilitation helping behaviors. In the context of a negotiation, this can be seen as actively offering concessions or providing critical information.

Alternatively, we can think about meeting your negotiation goals by conveying competence, so that your counterpart will engage in passive facilitation cooperative behaviors. In the context of a negotiation, this can be seen as counterparts lowering their own aspirations for the negotiation and therefore taking less aggressive economic stances, making quicker concessions or agreements, and also exiting the negotiation early, all behaviors that have been shown to hurt negotiation outcomes for your counterpart, which will in turn lead to more favorable outcomes for you (Giebels, De Dreu, & Van de Vliert, 2000; Liebert, Smith, Hill, & Keiffer, 1968; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Yukl, 1974a; Yukl, 1974b).

Thinking about the difference between objective and subjective values is also important for considering how warmth and competence can be communicated in a negotiation. A negotiation consists of both economic bargaining behavior (the numerical aspects of the negotiation such as the offers and counter-offers) and non-economic bargaining behavior (body language, tone, and word choice, such as the use of framing or rationales) (Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Lee & Ames, 2017; Maaravi, Ganzach, & Pazy, 2011; Rubin, Brockner, Eckenrode, Enright, & Johnson-George, 1980; Trötschel, Loschelder, Höhne, & Majer, 2015). Conveying warmth or competence through economic bargaining behavior looks very different from conveying warmth or competence through non-economic bargaining and importantly, can carry different consequences. As we go through the empirical research, we will make sure to delineate and keep a critical eye on whether we're looking at distributive versus integrative negotiations and whether it is economic versus non-economic behavior that is being manipulated, tracked or measured.

The second source of complexity in determining whether conveying warmth or competence would be more advantageous in a negotiation is that psychological models of social interaction offer differing predictions, particularly with regards to the warmth dimension. Following the "compensatory effect", we would expect that negotiators who come across as warm would be more likely to be perceived as incompetent, whereas negotiators who come across as competent would be more likely to be perceived as lacking warmth (Judd et al., 2005; Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Judd, & Nunes, 2009; Yzerbyt, Kervyn, & Judd, 2008). Negotiators who engage in hard bargaining strategies, such as haggling (a signal of bargaining competence or aggression) are perceived by their counterparts as disagreeable (perceptions of a lack of warmth)

given our tendencies to over attribute bargaining behaviors to personality dispositions, over situational constraints (Morris et al., 1999).

Norms of reciprocity and management research on conflict communication, however, offer a different prediction (Adams, 1965; Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 1961; Gallupe, Bastianutti, & Cooper, 1991; Lovelace, Shapiro, & Weingart, 2001; Mintzberg, Jorgensen, Dougherty, & Westley, 1996). Theories on reciprocity, based on principles of exchange, stem from the relatively straightforward notion that we offer benefits to those who offer us benefits (Adams, 1965; Gouldner, 1960; Homans, 1961). Reciprocity is a strong norm that governs our social interactions, including how we ask for favors, make requests, and demand compliance from others (Cialdini, 1993). Following norms of reciprocity, we would expect that negotiators who convey warmth would be more likely to receive warmth in return from their counterpart, while negotiators who convey a lack of warmth would be more likely to receive the same in return. In the conflict resolution literature, there is a large body of evidence to suggest that when an individual perceives his or her counterpart to be uncooperative, that individual will be more inclined to reciprocate with uncooperative strategies in future rounds of interaction (Bar-Tal & Geva, 1986; Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Radlow & Weidner, 1966; Sillars, 1980). In a related research tradition, management research has found collaborative communication to be positively associated with important organizational outcomes since it is more helpful and problem-solving in orientation (Lovelace et al., 2001). These theories of conflict communication would predict that cooperative negotiators who communicate with warmth would engender more positive collaboration from their counterparts.

A key feature of interpersonal theory is that it makes predictions with regard to how one person's behavior impacts the behavior of his or her interaction partner (Benjamin, 1974;

Carson, 1969; Leary, 1957; & Wiggins, 1982). Interpersonal style theory would offer a combined prediction that while affiliation would be returned in kind (warmth would be met with warmth, while hostility would be returned with hostility), dominance would be complementary (dominance would be met with submission, and vice versa).

As we keep in mind the two sources of complexity arising from the negotiation context and the differing psychological models, we will now look at how warmth and competence have been operationalized in the negotiation context. In looking at the different ways in which these two dimensions of social perception have been studied in the negotiation context, we will point out ways in which they are affected by the potential of value creation in the negotiation; the negotiators' objective and subjective goals; the economic and non-economic bargaining behavior; and how negotiation consequences align with the predictions offered by the psychological theories.

Competence in a negotiation

Individuals have strong desires to maintain positive impressions (Goffman, 1959; Leary, 1995) and this desire is salient in negotiations, whether you're negotiating for the first time with someone or upholding your reputation as a certain kind of negotiator. In general, when individuals want to appear competent, they will focus on self-promotion related behaviors such as talking about their achievements, displaying confidence, and also controlling the communication (Godfrey, Jones, & Lord, 1986; Jones & Pittman, 1982).

Our perceptions of a counterpart being a competent negotiator include competence, skill or expertise in the general domain of negotiating (*how good of a negotiator are you?*) as well as competence, skill or expertise in the specific domain over which we are negotiating (*how much critical information do you know?*). These perceptions are not mutually exclusive and

potentially highly correlated, but in certain negotiation contexts we may be able to and want to distinguish between these two kinds of competencies.

Competence can be communicated in a negotiation through both the content and delivery of the bargaining behavior. By content, we are referring to the actual bargaining behavior taking place, such as the timing, value, and specificity of the economic offers and counter-offers that are exchanged. By delivery, we are referring to the different ways in which these offers can be communicated, such as body language, tone, word choice, and the use of framing or rationales that accompany the economic offers.

How can competence be conveyed through first offers?

Extensive negotiation literature has focused on the importance of first offers in shaping negotiation outcomes (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Galinsky, Seidin, Kim, & Medvec, 2002; Gunia, Swaab, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2013; Liebert et al., 1968; Neale & Bazerman, 1991; Yukl, 1974b). First offers act as powerful anchors influencing all other offers that come after it (Benton, Kelley, & Liebling, 1972; Chertkoff & Conley, 1967; Liebert et al., 1968). First offers have been shown to be more accurate predictors of final outcomes, than subsequent concessionary behavior (Yukl, 1974b). Negotiators who make first offers hold the bargaining advantage (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), except for situations in which the first offer is so extreme as to result in an impasse (Schweinsberg, Ku, Wang, & Pillutla, 2012). Given that first offers act as powerful anchors that set the stage for the rest of the negotiation, the negotiator who is able to make that first offer can convey an important signal of competence.

The majority of research on this topic would suggest that signals of competence, made through the delivery of first offers, are perceived positively, in the sense that counterparts anchor their subsequent concessionary behavior to this first offer. This reactionary economic behavior

implies that counterparts are perceiving the first offer makers to be competent and the first offers to be valid economic signals. One limitation is when the first offer value is too extreme suggesting that perceptions of first offers as valid and first offer givers as competent are bound by a range of acceptable values. If the value of the first offer drastically strays from these bounds, counterparts may now perceive the offer makers negatively, seeing them as overly aggressive and hostile which leads to counterparts walking away from the negotiation (Schweinsberg et al., 2012).

Interestingly, the anchoring effects of first offers, which give negotiators who make them a bargaining advantage, can be overcome through some de-biasing techniques (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). The ability to take the perspective of a counterpart during a negotiation has been associated with positive outcomes (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Neale & Bazerman, 1993). Negotiators who engage in perspective-taking can counter the anchoring effects of their counterpart's first offer, by allowing the negotiator to think about information inconsistent with the implication of the first offer (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). In other words, when a buyer starts the negotiation with a very low first offer, this can often cause the seller to start thinking more pessimistically about the negative aspects of the item being negotiated over, but if the seller can take the perspective of the buyer and shift the focus to thinking about the buyer's alternatives, the anchoring effects of the first offer can be attenuated (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000). In this way, competence can be signaled through first offers offensively, in the case of being the one to make the first offer and anchoring counterpart's to your opening offer, or competence can be signaled through first offers defensively, by perspective-taking and countering the anchoring effects of first offers.

How can competence be conveyed through bargaining behavior?

Negotiation textbooks, empirical evidence, and lay advice instruct and demonstrate that making aggressive counter-offers while conceding little over time results in more advantageous economic outcomes (Ames & Wazlawek, 2014; Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; Curhan, Neale, Ross, & Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008; Gelfand, Major, Raver, Nishii, & O'Brien, 2006). In this way, the negotiators who are able to do this better than their counterparts will be perceived as more competent. Not too surprisingly, negotiators who are overly anchored on and yield to their counterparts' offers end up with less advantageous economic outcomes in a distributive negotiation (Barry & Friedman, 1998). Negotiators who are quick to yield in an integrative situation can also be more likely to hurt joint economic outcomes, because their yielding tendencies will cause parties to split the difference rather than finding mutually beneficial solutions that "expand the pie" (Thompson, 2009).

Economic bargaining behavior that is characterized by making aggressive or extreme first offers and minimizing one's own concessions has been characterized as "hard-line" bargaining, in contrast to "soft-line" bargaining associated with making moderate first offers and trying to elicit the other side to make concessions by making frequent and substantive concessions of one's own (Druckman, 1994). These differences in bargaining strategy can be seen as ways to convey competence and warmth, respectively, in the negotiation. A meta-analysis of these strategies in distributive negotiations found that "hard-line" bargaining strategies can lead to better economic outcomes, but "soft-line" bargaining strategies can lead to better subjective, socio-economic outcomes (Huffmeier, Freund, Zerres, Backhaus, & Hertel, 2004). This result points to the fact that the efficacy of conveying competence or warmth in a negotiation depends on the desired result. For one-time distributive negotiations where reputational concerns are of

no matter, the highest economic outcome may be the only desired result, but where interpersonal consequences reign supreme, subjective outcomes may be as important or even more important than economic outcomes (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006). For example, while hard-line bargaining strategies may provide fruitful in the short term, it may come at the cost of damaged trust relations which may ultimately undermine long term goals, that are both economic and interpersonal in nature (Campagna, Mislin, Kong, & Bottom, 2016).

Of course, the relationship between hard-line bargaining translating to more advantageous economic outcomes is not always straightforward. Overly aggressive offers can be met with greater resistance and therefore be returned with even more aggressive counter-offers (Benton et al, 1972). Snowball effects of aggression or dominance have been documented in related domains of conflict escalation, where pressure tactics backfire and lead to self-reinforcing cycles (Friedman, Tidd, Currall, & Tsai, 2000). Impasses have also been shown to be more likely in situations where negotiators walk away from overly aggressive economic bargaining behavior from their counterparts (Pillutla & Murnighan, 1996). As negotiators think about their economic bargaining behavior, they need to consider how their strategies can signal different perceptions of competence and warmth to their counterparts; what economic reactions will be triggered; and what costs they will pay, in terms of both economic and subjective outcomes.

How can competence be conveyed through the specificity or form of the offers?

In addition to the value and timing of these offers and counter-offers, recent empirical research has found that the specificity and form of the numerical offers also matters. First offers communicated with more specificity were more potent first offers, in terms of their anchoring effects (Mason, Lee, Wiley, & Ames, 2013). Negotiators who made more specific first offers

were seen as more knowledgeable and these inferences of competence made these specific first offers stronger anchors in the negotiation.

Also, contrary to traditional negotiation textbook advice, range offers have also been found to be more potent first offers because of a tandem anchoring effect (Ames & Mason, 2015). Range offer-makers were seen as less aggressive, less confident and more flexible than point offer-makers (Ames & Mason, 2015). Recipients of range offers felt it was more impolite to turn down a range offer than a single value offer (Ames & Mason, 2015). The compensatory effect seems to be at play here with respect to perceptions, where recipients of range offers find the offer-makers to be warmer but less competent. What's interesting here is that the warmth (as conveyed through the format of the numerical offer) is reciprocated with economic bargaining behavior that is more advantageous to the offer-maker. While range offer-makers were seen as high on warmth but low on competence, counterparts did not try to take advantage of them economically, but instead reciprocated perceived warmth with more conciliatory economic behavior (Ames & Mason, 2015).

How can competence be conveyed through information disclosure?

Information is power in a negotiation and a competent negotiator is someone who is well-informed about critical information and can distinguish when it's advantageous to disclose such information (Thompson, 1991; Thompson, 2009). Many negotiations in the real world involve asymmetry in the information known between the two parties (Wolfe & McGinn, 2005). For integrative negotiations, the ability to reach mutual gains depends on the exchange of critical information (Thompson, 1991; Thompson, 2009). Negotiators who are able to consider the constraints and goals of their counterpart by eliciting diagnostic information are more successful (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008). Unfortunately, negotiators commit two common

errors in relation to information disclosure: they seek out far less than they should about diagnostic information the counterpart holds and they erroneously believe that disclosing any of their own information will be harmful (Thompson, 1991; Thompson, 2009).

Some information needs to be disclosed to gain mutual benefits in an integrative negotiation, but the disclosure of some information could result in asymmetric gains. The sharing of information related to underlying interests, priorities, and key facts are important for maximizing the pie (Thompson, 1991; Thompson, 2009). This kind of information can reveal important differences the parties have on their valuations of certain issues; expectations of certain events happening; as well as differences in capabilities, attitudes toward risk; and also time preferences (Thompson, 1991; Thompson, 2009). Knowing and capitalizing on these differences is what can lead to discovery of mutually beneficial outcomes in integrative agreements.

On the other hand, disclosing information related to your BATNA could be disadvantageous (Fisher et al., 2011; Thompson, 1991; Thompson, 2009). Revealing information about your BATNA is only helpful in situations when you know your BATNA is stronger than the other side thinks it is (Thompson, 2009). Without knowing, however, complete and precise information on how much your counterpart thinks about your BATNA, revealing your BATNA is generally considered a risky move. In this way, a competent negotiator is not necessarily the person who discloses the least information, but someone who is aware of and in control of the different kinds of information and how their disclosure will differentially affect outcomes.

How can competence be conveyed through strategic expressions of anger?

Competence in negotiations can be conveyed and perceived through the use of emotions. Anger and compassion are the two most commonly studied emotions in negotiations as they are

thought to be the two other-directed emotions that strongly influence negotiation outcomes (Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, & Raia, 1997). Anger, in particular, is of interest to our inquiry as expressing anger can be a way to convey competence in a negotiation. Anger expression has been linked to both negative and positive outcomes in a negotiation and these conflicting results point to important moderating factors that determine whether anger can hurt or help in a negotiation.

Strategic expressions of anger, as operationalized through facial and physical expressions and certain aggressive word choice, are associated with greater value claiming, but only when the recipients of the anger have poor alternatives (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). Anger is theorized to elicit compliance because negotiators “track” each other’s emotional states (Van Kleef, De Dreu, & Manstead, 2004). Negotiators are therefore more likely to concede when they interact with angry counterparts, than happy counterparts, because they feel the need to make concessions in order to avoid an impasse (Van Kleef et al., 2004). Negotiators who expressed anger via electronic negotiation achieved higher individual outcomes, than negotiators who expressed happiness, (Belkin, Kurtzberg, & Naquin, 2013). Interestingly, as negotiators become limited in their motivation or ability to consider their counterpart’s emotional states, these effects disappear (Van Kleef et al., 2004). Strategic expressions of anger can convey an upper hand in the negotiation, and therefore elicit compliance, when the recipient infers the anger to signal a potential impasse and to the extent that the recipient fears an impasse, because of a poor BATNA.

Other empirical research has come to the opposite finding that positive emotions conveying warmth such as friendliness, cooperativeness, and empathy are more effective at eliciting compliance in a negotiation, than negative emotions such as anger and aggression

(Kopelman, Rosette, & Thompson, 2006). In the context of an ultimatum, negotiators are more effective in gaining concessions from the other side with positive emotional displays, over negative ones (Kopelman et al., 2006). In order to make sense of these conflicting empirical findings, other scholars have presented a dual process model to understand how strategic expressions can both help negotiators by extracting concessions but also hurt negotiators by eliciting competition (Van Kleef & Cote, 2007). The dual process model posits that two important factors in whether anger will hurt or help are the perceived appropriateness of the anger and also the amount of power that the recipient of the anger has in the negotiation (Van Kleef & Cote, 2007). High power negotiators are unaffected by inappropriate anger, whereas low power negotiators concede to angry opponents regardless of its appropriateness (Van Kleef & Cote, 2007).

Strategically expressing anger in a negotiation can be one way in which to use emotional displays to convey competence in an attempt to gain an upper hand in the negotiation. As negotiators think about using this strategy, however, they must take into account a number of factors that will shape whether the anger expression will hurt or help their negotiation goals, including the appropriateness of the anger (as perceived by the counterpart); the type of negotiation at stake (one time versus repeated interaction); and the extent to which the counterpart has good alternatives to the negotiation.

Warmth in a negotiation

Given the primacy of warmth judgments in social perception, it's interesting to consider whether this holds true in a mixed motive situation, such as a negotiation. It may be that impressions of warmth, or the absence of it, can set the stage for the entire bargaining exchange as negotiators first make assessments of how cooperative or competitive their counterpart intends

to be. These juxtaposed motivations of cooperation and competition have long been studied in negotiations to see the extent to which they enable negotiation goals (De Dreu et al., 2000; Olekalns & Smith, 1999; Olekalns & Smith, 2003; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Weingart, Bennett, & Brett, 1993; Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007). Negotiation scholars and practitioners have long extolled the virtues of embracing an affiliational interpersonal style in integrative negotiation settings, where parties' interests are neither completely opposed nor completely compatible (Fisher et al., 2011; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt, 1981). On the practitioner side, Ron Shapiro, the legendary sports agent and founder of the Shapiro Negotiation Institute, has devoted an entire book to this subject titled "The Power of Nice" (Shapiro, 2001). In This American Life's radio essay titled "Good Guys," producers Ben Calhoun and Ira Glass test the efficacy of appealing to salespeople with warm camaraderie in hopes of obtaining a "good guy discount" (Calhoun, 2014).

A warm interpersonal style, defined by the literature and practitioners as pro-social, cooperative, and nice, has been shown to improve financial outcomes by virtue of creating extra value for both parties, known as increasing the pie. Cooperative negotiators trust each other, therefore exchange more critical information, which thereby allows them to come to more beneficial joint outcomes (De Dreu & Boles, 1998; De Dreu, Giebels, & Van de Vliert, 1998; De Dreu et al., 2000; Weingart et al., 1993). On the other hand, researchers have found that competitively motivated negotiators are more likely to erroneously view the integrative negotiation as a fixed value situation and therefore withhold information, take more distributive tactics, and thereby lose out on opportunities to find joint gains (De Dreu et al., 2000; O'Connor, Arnold & Burris, 2005). In this line of research, scholars find that reciprocity governs

negotiation motivations and behaviors so that cooperatively motivated behaviors are returned in kind, as are competitively motivated ones (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998).

How is warmth conveyed in an integrative versus distributive negotiation?

The positive economic and interpersonal consequences of taking on a warm interpersonal style in negotiations has some limitations. First and importantly, it applies to integrative negotiations, a fundamental feature of them being that there is opportunity for value creation (Fisher et al., 2011; Lax & Sebenius, 1986; Pruitt, 1991). In these situations, warmth helps secure mutually beneficial gains because expanding the pie requires disclosure of critical information and warmth helps build trust and rapport between the two parties which enable the sharing of information (De Dreu & Boles, 1998; De Dreu et al., 1998; De Dreu et al., 2000; Weingart et al., 1993).

On the other hand, a more competitively driven approach has been shown to have the opposite effect where negotiators do not trust each other which leads them to take on more distributive tactics and thereby fail to share information and come to mutually beneficial solutions (Tinsley, O'Connor, & Sullivan, 2002). Even within the context of integrative negotiators, a cooperative motivation is not always beneficial. When negotiators think cooperation, some of them think about this as requiring compromises which does not necessarily help parties reach mutually beneficial outcomes and sometimes distracts from their ability to do so (Thompson, 2009). What has found to be more effective is a dual-concern model where negotiators are concerned both about their own interests as well as the interests of their counterpart (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

A notable feature of most of the empirical research showing the positive effects of a cooperative orientation, versus a competitive one, is that outcomes are measured at the dyadic

level (De Dreu et al., 2000). In other words, a dyad of cooperative negotiators has been shown to create a final, joint outcome that is more economically advantageous than a dyad of competitive negotiators (De Dreu et al., 2000). What is less clear are how the advantages are divided up at the individual level. In other words, while a warm interpersonal style can result in a bigger pie, it's less clear whether a warm negotiator ends up with a smaller portion of that pie than more competitively orientated negotiators.

There is less empirical evidence on the consequence of warmth in distributive negotiations, but there is growing research to suggest that it can result in disadvantageous outcomes. Negotiators high in trait agreeableness were shown to do well in integrative settings, but poorly in distributive ones when their agreeableness became a liability (Barry & Friedman, 1998). Similarly, negotiators who were more likely to adopt cooperative strategies in a salary negotiation achieved lower salary gains, as compared to negotiators who used competitive approaches (Marks & Harold, 2011). Taking on a warm communication style in a distributive negotiation can actually hurt economic outcomes because counterparts to the warm negotiator respond with more aggressive counter offers than counterparts to a tough negotiator (Jeong, Minson, Yeomans, Gino, working paper).

Instructed to take on a warm, versus tough, communication style when making the identical first offer, negotiators increased their level of politeness, demonstrating that negotiators are able to vary communication style without varying their economic behavior and that negotiators convey higher levels of deference and respect when asked to be warm (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Jeong et al., working paper). Interestingly, counterparts to a warm negotiator reciprocate with warmth in their communication style, but then accompany this warmth in language with more aggressive economic behavior (Jeong et al., working paper). The proposed

mechanism for this difference is perceived dominance, which can manifest itself through communication style (Aries, Gold, & Weigel, 1983; Burgoon & Dunbar, 2000; Dunbar & Burgoon, 2005; Tiedens, Unzueta, & Young, 2007). Negotiators who use a warm communication style characterized by high levels of politeness are perceived as less dominant and therefore counterparts respond with more aggressive concessionary behavior than to tough, or less polite, negotiators who are perceived as higher in dominance (Jeong et al., working paper).

How is warmth conveyed in content versus style?

The myriad of research pitting cooperative versus competitive orientations against each other and espousing the value-creating abilities of the former do not focus on separating out economic and non-economic behavior. A closer look at the empirical methods used in this research shows that negotiators who were manipulated to act cooperatively versus competitively were not restricted in varying their economic behavior to match their manipulated orientation (e.g. De Dreu et al., 2000). A cooperative orientation has commonly been manipulated through instruction to consider the interests of the counterpart (as compared to a sole focus on self-interest); to expect a future cooperative interaction (versus a future individual task); or given incentives to maximize joint outcomes (as opposed to individual outcomes) (Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984; De Dreu et al., 1998; De Dreu et al., 2000; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Weingart et al., 1993). A negotiator who was instructed to be cooperative could have chosen to take on a warmer, more cooperative communication style or could have chosen to make less aggressive and more frequent economic concessions, or both. In this way, it is unclear whether the cooperative manipulation led to differential outcomes because of changes in the economic versus non-economic behavior. In the context of distributive negotiators, a warm communication style over

a tough communication style resulted in less favorable economic outcomes when first offers were held constant and concessionary behavior was tracked (Jeong et al., working behavior).

While the aggressiveness of first offers and counteroffers can communicate the negotiator's competencies, as far as both their bargaining power and prowess, these numerical values are not communicated in a vacuum. Instead, they are couched in words that communicate a variety of information, which can convey different impressions of the negotiator making these numerical offers (Bowles & Babcock, 2013; Lee & Ames, 2017; Trötschel et al., 2015). In this way, the negotiated outcomes between individuals are not straightforward consequences of pure economic bargaining behaviors, as traditional economic models might suggest (Crawford & Sobel, 1982; Farrell & Rabin, 1996), but reflect the psychological dynamics at play.

The same counter offer can be framed in several different ways which scholars have shown can result in different consequences. An offer which is less than what your counterpart seeks can be framed as a constraint due to your own personal budgetary restrictions or it can be framed as the appropriate amount given some kind of criticism aimed at the object of negotiation (Lee & Ames, 2007). Constraint rationales are more effective than disparagement rationales in yielding desired economic results and also positive interpersonal consequences (Less & Ames, 2007).

In a similar vein, negotiators who employed the strategy of framing an economic value as something *offered* to their counterpart, as opposed to *requested* from their counterpart, were able to gain greater concessions (Trötschel et al., 2015). More advantageous economic and interpersonal consequences were obtained from negotiators who acknowledged and gave credit to their counterparts for concessions (Ward, Disston, Brenner, & Ross, 2008). Similarly, emphasizing the benefits of a concession from the perspective of the counterpart assisted in

negotiators getting better deals and preserving positive relationships (Bhatia, Chow, & Weingart, 2016). In sum, framing and rationales that convey warmth are able to justify and sometimes soften the blow of less than ideal economic offers. In turn, this can lead to a reciprocation of warmth, both economically and interpersonally, as counterparts are more open to accepting these offers and feel more positively about these negotiators.

To what extent are perceptions of warmth and competence in a negotiation a dynamic process?

In most of the research that found cooperative motivations to yield better outcomes than competitive motivations, the motivations were manipulated at the level of the dyad, meaning that two cooperative negotiators did better than two competitive negotiators (De Dreu et al., 2000). Of course, in the real world, we don't know the motivations and intentions of our counterpart. Some research suggests there is a convergence toward competition in mixed motivation dyads, so that if a cooperative negotiator meets a competitive one, it is the cooperative negotiator who will change (Weingart, et al., 2007).

Given that negotiations take place between at least two individuals, it's interesting to consider not only one-way perceptions of warmth and competence, but also the symbiotic nature of how one negotiator's warmth or competence affects the other negotiator's warmth or competence. Recent empirical research looking at how dominant or deferential individuals are in a negotiation found that the most optimal integrative agreements were reached by negotiators who had complementary styles in expressing dominance (Wiltermuth, Tiedens, & Neale, 2015). This occurred because negotiators who were dominant were generally assertive in expressing what they wanted, while negotiators who were submissive generally asked questions in order to achieve what they wanted to know and so this complementarity resulted in optimal information

being exchanged without conflict escalation which ultimately led to more successful and mutually beneficial outcomes (Wiltermuth et al., 2015).

In addition to social perceptions arising from a negotiator's economic and non-economic bargaining behavior, perceptions and subsequent reactionary behavior arise also from certain characteristics about the negotiator, including their gender. How does communicating warmth and competence in a negotiation differentially affect female negotiators? Literature on gender stereotypes show that women are expected to be more communal and less agentic than men (Bem, 1974; Fiske & Lee, 2008). Application of the warmth and competence dimensions to gender stereotypes has found that women who are high in warmth (but low in competence), such as housewives, are disrespected but pitied whereas women who are high in competence (but low in warmth), such as career women, are disliked but envied (Fiske et al., 2002). When women exhibit behaviors that are inconsistent with their prescribed stereotypes, such as acting aggressively or dominantly, they are punished (Rudman & Glick, 2001). This holds true in negotiation conflicts, where research shows that women who act in self-promoting ways during salary negotiations and job interviews receive negative backlash (Amantullah & Tinsley, 2013; Babcock & Laschever, 2009; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Kray & Thompson, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 2001). Unfortunately, even when women act in stereotype-consistent ways in a negotiation, their accommodating behavior is not reciprocated by their counterparts (Wazlawek & Stephens, 2017).

Conclusion

In sum, our social perceptions of warmth and competence help us navigate our professional and personal interactions by determining how we perceive people and consequently how we behave towards them. These perceptions are also critical in negotiation contexts, where

we cooperate and compete with others to accomplish our individual goals. How warm and competent we perceive our counterparts affect the negotiation strategies we choose to adopt, which ultimately determine negotiation outcomes. Warmth and competence can be communicated through how we bargain economically; the information we select to disclose; the emotions we signal; as well as the framing and rationale we use to deliver our economic offers. The prescription on whether conveying one or the other is more advantageous is not a simple equation because we need to make a number of important considerations including identifying whether there is potential for value creation; distinguishing between economic and non-economic behavior; and considering both economic and interpersonal consequences. The successful negotiator is one who navigates the intricate and consequential nature of social perception while accounting for the nuances and complexities arising from the negotiation context.

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